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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JEFFREY GILES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050162-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his convictions for two counts of failure to respond to an officer's 
signal to stop, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-13.5 (West 2004). 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(e)(West 2004). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial? 
Standard of Review: "This court 'will not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion 
for mistrial absent an abuse of discretion.'" State v. Widdison, 2000 UT App 185, ^ [57,4 P.3d 
100 (quoting State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1230 (Utah 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A - Rule 16. DISCOVERY - Utah R. Cr. P. 16(l)(2)(West 2004) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with two counts of failure to respond to an 
officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 
(West 2004) (R9-10). Following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over for trial 
on both counts (R26-27). 
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a written request for discovery, which included a 
request for the criminal record of the defendant (R19-21). Prior to trial, the prosecution 
provided defendant with written notice that it planned to present defendant's prior 
convictions at trial (R36-38). 
During trial, the prosecutor asked defendant: "Isn't it true, Mr. Giles, that you've ran 
[sic] from the police before?" (R100:202). Defendant answered: "I was 18. It was on my 
18th birthday. I went two blocks and then went on foot." (Id.). At that point, defense counsel 
objected and a discussion was held out of the presence of the jury (R100:202-07). The 
objection was sustained (R100:202, 206). The jury was admonished to disregard the last 
question and response (R100:207). At the conclusion of the evidence, after the jury retired 
to deliberate, but before it returned a verdict, defense counsel made a motion for a mistrial 
based on the question concerning the prior conviction (R100:238, 241). The motion was 
denied (R100:242). 
The jury found defendant guilty on both counts (R70). He received a suspended 
sentence (R83). Defendant timely appealed (R90). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The First Pursuit. On July 3, 2004 Orem Police Officers received a domestic 
violence call involving defendant (R4; 100:53). Although the officers were unable to find 
defendant that day, at 2:15 the next morning they spotted him at a 7-Eleven near Center 
Street and 1200 West (R100:54-55, 82). The officers began to follow defendant as he exited 
the parking lot, turning west on Center Street and then south on 1-15 (R100:56, 84). 
Defendant was traveling at approximately 40-45 miles per hour (R100:57, 84). Just before 
the University Parkway exit the officers turned on their lights to pull defendant over 
(Rl 00:57-58, 94). Defendant did not pull over, so the officers turned on their wigwags 
(alternate flashing high beams) and sirens (Rl 00:58-59). Defendant continued to travel south 
on 1-15, eventually leaving the freeway on Center Street in Provo (Rl00:59, 95). 
Officers continued to pursue, traveling east on Center Street before turning north on 
900 West (Rl00:60). Defendant then began to speed up, reaching 50 miles per hour 
(R100:61). At 500 North defendant ran a stop sign, turned left, and accelerated to 70-75 
miles per hour (R100:61, 88). Officers decided to call off the pursuit due to safety concerns 
as the speeds continued to increase (Rl00:62, 64, 97), 
The Second Pursuit. Later that morning, defendant was spotted driving northbound 
on Geneva Road by Provo police officers, who began pursuit with their lights on (R100:65, 
98, 99). Orem officers joined in the pursuit at 800 North with their lights on as well (R100: 
99, 117). While the pursuit began at 40 miles per hour, it quickly accelerated to 
approximately 90 miles per hour as defendant headed up Provo Canyon (Rl 00:100-01,118). 
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At the Squaw Peak tumoff defendant made a right hand turn and drove up as the officers 
followed (R100:101, 120). Once defendant reached the top he turned around, driving back 
down the mountain (Rl 00:102-103, 121). 
The officers continued the pursuit as the Utah Highway Patrol set up spikes near the 
middle and bottom of the road (R100:102-03, 106, 122). As defendant rounded the comer 
near the first set of spikes he slammed on his breaks, initially missing the spikes but sliding 
into two police cars (Rl 00:66,105,123). Defendant then threw his van into reverse, backing 
over one of the spikes with one tire, and continued to go down the mountain (R100:67,106, 
123). At the bottom of Squaw Peak, defendant hit the second set of spikes, flattening his 
remaining tires. (Id). Officers boxed defendant in with their cars, forcing him to come to 
a complete stop (R100:123). Defendant was then arrested with no further resistance 
(R100:68,107, 124). 
Defense Trial Theory. Defendant was charged with two counts of failure to respond 
to an officer's signal to stop. His theory at trial was voluntary intoxication (Rl 00:214,226-
27). To support this theory, witnesses testified that defendant had been acting strangely 
during the weeks preceding the incident, and that he had a history of drug use, although no 
one actually saw defendant use drugs immediately prior to these incidents (Rl00:135-38, 
141,146,151,153-55,157,160,164-65,171,177). Defendant testified that he had been out 
all night using methamphetamine, and that he had used "meth" and had "a drink" that day, 
but he did not remember the police pursuits (R100:182-83, 186). Upon arrest, officers 
searched both the defendant and the van, but found no drugs or alcohol (R100:68, 124). 
4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for 
a mistrial. Defendant claims that a mistrial was warranted because the prosecutor willfully 
violated rule 16 o f I he Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
The trial court properly denied the motion for a mistrial. The ill sustained 
defendant's objection and the jury received a curative instruction that they should disregard 
the question and response. Defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by what occurred. 
Any error was harmless. The evidence against defendaiit was very strong, therefore any 
effect that may have survived the court's curative instruction is unlikely to have influenced 
the jury's verdict. In addition, denial of the motion for a mistrial could be affirmed on the 
alternative ground tha< • / osecutor i: annul be cited for a discovery violation where the 
defendant had knowledge of the existence of the item the State failed to disclose. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL 
On appeal, defendant claims that the prosecutor acted intentionally and in bad faith 
when he failed to disclose evidence of a prior conviction for the same offense (Aplt's br. at 
19). Defendant therefore claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. 
Id. at 20. 
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A. Additional relevant facts. 
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant: "Isn't it true, Mr. Giles, 
that you've ran [sic] from the police before?" (R100:202). Defendant answered: "I was 18. 
It was on my 18th birthday. I went two blocks and then went on foot." (Id.). At that point, 
defense counsel objected and a discussion was held out of the presence of the jury 
(R100:202-07). 
The prosecutor had a printout that showed that defendant had pled guilty to failure to 
stop at the command of a police officer, a third-degree felony (R100:202). Defense counsel 
advised the court that he believed this conviction had been reduced to a class A 
misdemeanor, and that the record was incomplete (Rl00:203). The court said: "Let's find 
out first if it has been reduced." (Rl00:203). However, the answer to this question is not 
apparent from the record. 
Defense counsel argued that there were two issues. First, that the prior conviction 
couldn't come in if it had been reduced to a class A misdemeanor. Second, that the State had 
provided him with a copy of defendant's criminal history that didn't show this conviction 
(Rl 00:204). 
Prior to trial, in answer to defendant's discovery request, the prosecution gave a copy 
of defendant's criminal history to defense counsel. However, the criminal history provided 
was apparently not complete (Rl00:205). The prosecutor stated that he didn't realize it 
wasn't complete until shortly before trial (Id). The prosecutor stated that he just found the 
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prior conviction at issue the day before trial (Id). However, ilk* prosecutor did m >i pro\ ide 
defense counsel with a copy before questioning defendant about it (Rl00:205-06). 
The court said: "I think you have a duty to disclose. I think it should have been 
disclosed. You had it in your possession yesterday. You should have disclosed it yesterday. 
Or at least today. A prior conviction for the exact same offense the defendant is on f.rial for 
being held back in the event the defendant testified - Fm not going to allow it. Objection 
is sustained." (R100:206), 
After the trial court sustained the objection, defense counsel moved to have anything 
from the record talking about the prior conviction stricken. The court said: "You can't move 
to strike that from the record, but I can surely admonish the jury." (Rl 00:207). The court 
said: "Members of tin jiin il vim'II disregard anything at all that might come to your 
attention regarding the last question or any of the responses that yo • VM\ ha\.. h^t 
overheard here at the bench." (R100:207-08). 
The trial then proceeded. No further mention was made of the defendant's prior 
conviction in front of the jury. However, after the jury began their deliberations, but before 
they returned with a verdict, defense counsel made a motion for a mistrial (Rl 00:23 8). 
The trial judge asked: "What is the precise grounds for your motion, that you weren't 
given the criminal record timely to enable you to make a decision whether to put the 
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defendant on the stand?" (R100:240). Defense counsel answered: "Well, the fact that the 
jury heard the question and the answer."1 (Rl00:241). 
The trial judge then said: "It's clear that I granted your motion and didn't allow the 
question to be asked . . . and the exhibit to be entered because of the reasons that I felt that 
it had not been provided pursuant to Rule 16 in the discovery request. But I gave a curative 
instruction. Are you saying that that was prejudicial? What could I have done differently?" 
(R100:241). 
1
 On appeal, defendant also appears to be arguing that he is entitled to relief based 
on prosecutorial misconduct. However, defendant did not raise this as a basis for the 
motion for mistrial (Rl00:240-241). The trial court cannot have abused its discretion in 
denying a motion for mistrial based on an issue that was not raised. Defendant cannot 
raise this issue for the first time on appeal. "As a general rule, appellate courts will not 
consider an issue, including a constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal 
unless the trial court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional 
circumstances." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993). Because 
defendant does not argue that "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error" justifies a 
review of this issue, this Court should decline to consider it on appeal. State v. Pledger, 
896 P.2d 1226, 1229, FN 5 (Utah 1995). 
In addition, defendant would not be entitled to relief even if the prosecutorial 
misconduct claim were reviewed on the merits. "Because a trial court is in the best 
position to determine an alleged errors impact on the proceedings, [an appellate court] 
will not reverse a trial court's denial of a mistrial motion based on prosecutorial 
misconduct absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah 
1998). "This standard is met only if the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there 
is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable 
result for the defendant." Id. (additional citations and quotation marks omitted). 
As demonstrated below, defendant has not met and cannot meet this standard. See 
also State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, \ 24, 999 P.2d 7 (rejecting prosecutorial misconduct 
claim where trial court gave immediate curative instruction and then additional curative 
instruction in overall jury instructions, concluding that "[defendant has not shown, as is 
his burden, that the comment was so prejudicial as to defeat the mitigating effect of the 
court's two curative instructions"); and State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 805 (Utah App. 
1998) (rejecting prosecutorial misconduct claim where, "even if there was error," "the 
evidence against defendant.. . was considerable"; citing cases). 
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Defense counsel responded by saying: "My belief is that it's just simply something 
that can't be cured. Once they've heard it, they've heard it. Even though we give a curative 
instruction, I think that's something that can't be cured. And it is a valid point also that, had 
I known that there was a possible allegation floating out there, I would have discussed that 
with Mr. Giles and been able to discuss the fact that he could be impeached wiu 
taking the stand. Without that knowledge, I didn't know anything about it so I couldn't 
discuss that with 1 1 Giles in making our decision to put him on the stand." (R100:241). 
In ruling on the motion for a mistrial, the trial judge said: "I th iiil : tl ie appropi iate 
remedy was handled pursuant to Rule 16 and the evidence was not allowed to be received 
either for impeachment or any other purpose. I don't find that the level of prejudice amounts 
to the level of a mistrial. The motion is denied." (Rl 00:242). 
The denial of the motion for a mistrial sh :: til :1 I: • € • ••• 
affirmed on alternative grounds. 
Although the trial court's ruling was correct, the easier route here is to affirm on an 
alternative ground. See O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Board, 956 P.2d 279, 280 (Utah 
1998). Defendant's claim is defeated by the obvious and decisive fact that "the prosecutor 
cannot be cited for a discovery violation where the defendant had knowledge of the existence 
of the item that the State failed to disclose." State v. Whittle, 1999 IIT 96, TJ25, 989 P.2d 52 
(quoting State v. White, 931 S.W.2d 825, 832-33 (Mo.Ct.App. 1996)(citing Hughes v. 
Hopper, 629 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 933, 101 S.Ct. 1396 (1981)). 
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See also Jennette v. State, 398 S.E.2d 734, 738 (Ga. App. 1990) ("The Brady rule applies 
only to exculpatory material unknown to the appellant"). 
Defendant was obviously aware of this prior conviction, because he was the person 
convicted. In addition, defense counsel acknowledged that he was aware of this conviction 
when he advised the court that he believed this conviction had been reduced to a class A 
misdemeanor (R100:203).2 
Therefore, even if the prosecutor violated the discovery rule by failing to disclose 
defendant's prior conviction, this type of technical violation should not entitle defendant to 
a new trial, where he already knew about his own prior conviction. 
C. After finding a violation of Rule 16, the trial court 
sustained the objection and gave a curative 
instruction. 
Utah's discovery rules require that upon request, the prosecutor shall disclose to the 
defense "the criminal record of the defendant" and the "prosecutor has a continuing duty to 
make disclosure." Utah R. Cr. P. 16(a)(2) and (b)(West 2004). The rule also states what the 
court may do if a party fails to comply with the rule: 
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court 
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or 
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
2
 Obviously, there was still a question as to whether the conviction had been 
reduced or not, and whether it would be admissible if it had been reduced. However, this 
question disappeared when the court granted defendant's objection and excluded the 
evidence. 
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Utah R.Cr. P. 16(g). 
In this case, the trial court sustained defendant's obj ection, prohibited the prosecution 
from introducing evidence of the defendant's prior conviction, and gave a cautionary 
instruction to the jury. 
On appeal, defendant argues that the "prosecutor acted intenti-: \\l 
when he withheld evidence of a prior conviction." (Aplt. br. at 19, 24). However, when a 
trial i o I is considering whether the discovery rule has been violated, "[t]he good or bad 
faith of the prosecutor is irrelevant." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 918, FN5 (Utah 1987) 
(quoting State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984)). 
What is relevant is whether the defendant was prejudiced. "[A] breach of the 
discovery rules does not warrant reversal absent a showing of prejudice to the defendant." 
State v. Blair, 868P.2d802, 807 (Utah 1993). " [T]he trial court has ar:;pi> power to obviate 
any prejudice resulting from a breach of the criminal discovery rules, ±± it does so, the 
defendant obviously cannot complain of the prosecutor's conduct, since the defendant's 
substantial rights will not have been affected." Knight, 134 P.2d at 918. In this case, 
defendant has failed to establish that he suffered any prejudice, especially in light of the trial 
court's curative instruction. 
A complaint that the remedy ordered to correct a violation of Rule 16 was 
"insufficient to obviate the harm" is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State 
v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 1994). "The trial court's discretion in fashioning a 
remedy for a violation is not abused unless prejudice sufficient to result in a reversal of the 
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conviction occurred due to the discovery violation." Id. "An abuse of discretion occurs 
when, taking into account any remedial measures ordered by the trial court, the prejudice to 
the defendant still satisfied the standard for reversible error set forth in Rule 30." Knight, 
734 P.2d at 918. Rule 30 states that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does 
not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." Utah R. Cr. P. 30(a) (West 
2004). 
In this case, the jury was admonished to "disregard anything at all that might come to 
your attention regarding the last question or any of the responses that you may have heard or 
overheard here at the bench." (Rl00:207-08). "[Cjurative instructions are a settled and 
necessary feature of our judicial process and one of the most important tools by which a court 
may remedy errors at trial." State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271 (Utah 1998). 
Courts "generally presume that a jury will follow the instructions given it." Menzies, 
889 P.2d at 401; State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880,883-84 (Utah App. 1992). Therefore, this court 
should presume that the jury followed the instructions given and disregarded the question and 
answer concerning defendant previously running from police. Considering the "nature of the 
testimony and the fact that it was not vivid or graphic, there is no reason to believe that the 
jury would be uniquely unable to follow the court's instructions and ignore the testimony. 
As such, the remedy ordered was entirely sufficient to cure the discovery violation." 
Menzies, 889 P.2dat401. 
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D. .- The trial court did not abuse its discrciimi in denying ' 
defendant's motion for a mistrial. 
Even though a curative instruction was given, defendant later made a motion for a 
mistrial. The trial court denied the motion because it believed that the "appropriate remedy 
was handled pursuant to Rule 16 and the evidence was not allowed to be received either for 
impeachment or any other purpose." (Rl00:242). The trial court found that the level of 
prejudice did not amount to the level of a mistrial. Id. 
A trial court's denial of a motion for a mistrial is subject to very limited review on 
appeal. State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, \ 24, 61 P.3d 1000. "A trial court's denial of a motion for 
mistrial will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Martinez, 2002 UT App 
126, H36, 47 P.3d 115 (quoting State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, \ 54, 28 P.3d 1278). "This 
is because the trial court is in the best position to determine whether the incident prejudiced 
the jury." Id. An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision to deny a motion for mistrial 
"with just deference because of the advantaged position of the trial judge to determine the 
impact of events occurring in the courtroom on the total proceedings." State v. Cardall, 1999 
UT 51,1J20, 982 P.2d 79 (quoting Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1231); see also State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
"If the trial court determines that the incident probably did not prejudice the jury, the 
court should deny the motion" for a mistrial. State v. Widdison, 2000 UT App 185, \ 57, 4 
P.3d 100. "Once the trial court has exercised [its] discretion and made [its] judgment 
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thereon, the prerogative of this court on review is much more limited." State v. Alfred, 2002 
UT App. 291, \ 20, 55 P.3d 1158 (quoting Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1231). 
"Unless a review of the record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong in that 
the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair 
trial, [an appellate court] will not find that the court's decision was an abuse of discretion." 
Robertson, 932 P.2d at \21\\see also State v. Dominguez, 2003 UT App 158, f39, 72 P.3d 
127; Martinez, 2002 UT App 126 at |36; Alfred, 2002 UT App 291 at ^ {20; State v. Madsen, 
2002 UT App 345, f 12, 57 P.3d 1134; Widdison, 2000 UT App. 185 at 1J57; Cardall, 1999 
UT51 at^fl9. 
Defendant's argument that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion 
for a mistrial fails because he has not demonstrated that any error "so likely influenced the 
jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1231. 
"For purposes of determining whether a mistrial should have been granted, [the 
appellate court's] overriding concern is that defendant received a fair trial." Harmon, 956 
P.2d at 276. Defendant in this case received a fair trial. The trial court properly denied the 
motion for a mistrial because defendant's objection was sustained, the prosecutor was not 
allowed to admit evidence of the prior conviction, and the jury was admonished to disregard 
the question already asked and answered. 
In addition, the question and answer were not pivotal to defendant's conviction. 
There was very strong and substantial evidence, including a video tape of one of the incidents 
(see State's exhibit 2), which established that defendant was guilty of failing to respond to 
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an officer's signal to stop. Any prejudice that might have survived the court's curative 
instruction was unlikely to have had any effect on the jury's verdict, and "certainly not an 
effect that would rise to the level necessary to require reversal." Menzies, 889 P.2d at 401. 
In sum, given the limited nature of the prosecutor's question and defendant's answer, 
the fact that defendant's objection was sustained, the curative instructions that followed, and 
the strength of the evidence establishing defendant's guilt, defendant cannot establish that 
he was prejudiced. Therefore, this Court should find that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED April _ / _ , 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
ERIN RILEY 
Assistant Attorney Gen&ral 
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 16 
West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
••RULE 16. DISCOVERY 
(a ) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the 
following material or information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt 
of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be made 
available to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b ) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and 
before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose to the prosecutor such 
information as required by statute relating to alibi or insanity and any other item of evidence which 
the court determines on good cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for 
the prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d ) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days 
before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e ) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make disclosure by 
notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, tested or copied at 
specified reasonable times and places. The prosecutor or defense may impose reasonable limitations 
on the further dissemination of sensitive information otherwise subject to discovery to prevent 
improper use of the information or to protect victims and witnesses from harassment, abuse, or 
undue invasion of privacy, including limitations on the further dissemination of videotaped interviews, 
photographs, or psychological or medical reports. 
( f ) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be denied, 
restricted, or deferred, that limitations on the further dissemination of discovery be modified or make 
such other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make 
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the judge 
http://web2.westlaw.com/rpQnlt/^^^"^—++—^ — ° 
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alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such an ex parte showing, the entire text 
of the party's statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made 
available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
( g ) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that 
a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or 
inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it 
may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
(h ) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and other bodily materials which 
can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable 
notice of the time and place of such appearance shall be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure 
of the accused to appear or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of 
the court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial release, may be 
offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration along with other evidence 
concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should 
deem appropriate. 
[Amended effective November 1, 2001.] 
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